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11 Introduction
A common problem in dynamic economic theory is to determine when an increase
in a parameter and/or an initial condition increases the future dynamics of a
theoretical economy. Consider three examples. In capital theory when does an
increase in the discount factor or the initial capital stock increase the capital stock
in all future periods? In consumer theory when does an increase in earnings risk
or initial wealth lead a consumer to increase expected wealth holding in all future
periods over the life cycle? In human capital theory when does an increase in
the dispersion of the initial human capital distribution lead to an increase in
the dispersion of the human capital distribution in all future periods over the
life cycle? Such questions are the focus of a theory of monotone comparative
dynamics.
This paper o®ers a general approach to monotone comparative dynamics ques-
tions in models with a recursive structure. The approach has two key features.
First, at a point in time a consumer, ¯rm or economy is described by a state
variable. The analysis then focuses on the distribution (i.e. probability measure)
of the state variable. The distribution can be interpreted in a number of ways
depending on the application. For example, in single agent problems in the pres-
ence or absence of uncertainty it describes the probability that the agent (e.g. a
consumer, ¯rm or economy) will be in a particular state or collection of states in
a future period as viewed from the current period. In multiple agent problems
without uncertainty it describes the actual realized distribution of agents over
states in a future period. In problems with a continuum of agents and idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty the distribution also describes the actual realized distribution
of agents over states. Second, these distributions have a recursive structure. To
specify this let ¸ denote a distribution. The recursive structure is then given
by ¸ = T ¸ , where the function T maps the period j distribution into the j+1 jµ j jµ
period j + 1 distribution and µ is a parameter governing dynamics.
The monotone comparative dynamics proposition that is the focus of this
paper is given below. The proposition considers two sequences of distributions
0 0 0
0 f¸ g and f¸ g de¯ned recursively by ¸ = T ¸ and ¸ = T ¸ . These j j+1 jµ j jµ j j+1 j
0 sequences may di®er because an initial condition di®ers (i.e. ¸ 6 = ¸ ) and/or 1 1
0 because a parameter µ di®ers (i.e. µ 6 = µ ) that governs the dynamics of the
0 economy. The proposition below states that ¸ is larger than ¸ in every period j j
0 provided that this is true in the ¯rst period and that µ is larger than µ .
20 0 0 µ ¸ µ and ¸ º ¸ =) ¸ º ¸ ;j = 1;2;:::: £ 1 j 1 j
This paper provides necessary and su±cient conditions for this proposition to
hold. These conditions can be stated at various levels of abstraction each with
its own merits. When these conditions are stated directly in terms of properties
of the map T they turn out to be quite simple and to have great generality. At jµ
this level of abstraction these conditions apply to arbitrary binary relations º
on distributions that are re°exive and transitive and to arbitrary re°exive binary
relations ¸ on parameters. This result could be interpreted as saying that at £
a high enough level of abstraction all monotone comparative dynamics problems
are alike and have a simple structure.
To apply these results to concrete problems, it is important to develop detailed
characterizations of these conditions at lower levels of abstraction for speci¯c
choices of the binary relation º used to order distributions. Thus, for a speci¯c
problem the process is one of reverse engineering. The map T is written in terms jµ
of deeper structure derived from the problem at hand. Then either su±cient or
necessary conditions, stated in terms of this deeper structure, are backed out
from the necessary and su±cient conditions stated in terms of the map T . jµ
One useful level of abstraction to consider is where the dynamics of the model
can be stated in terms of properties of a decision rule and properties of an ex-
ogenous Markov shock process. A decision rule maps the state variable in a
given period into a value of the decision variables. The distribution of the state
then follows a Markov process determined by the decision rule and the exogenous
shocks. The decision rule can be viewed as a rule of thumb, can be estimated
from data or can be derived as the solution to a maximization problem. The last
interpretation is familiar from the theory of dynamic programming.
When stochastic dominance is used to order distributions, it turns out that
su±cient conditions for monotone comparative dynamics are easy to state in
1 terms of properties of the decision rule and shock process. When the decision
rule is increasing in both the state variable and the parameter governing dynamics
and when the exogenous shock process is increasing in the sense of stochastic
dominance both in the current shock and in the parameter then the monotone
comparative dynamics proposition holds. When a decision rule is derived as a
1Stochastic dominance, sometimes called ¯rst order stochastic dominance, is a strong notion of monotone
0 comparative dynamics. It is strong since a distribution ¸ stochastically dominates a distribution ¸ implies
that the expectation of any variable that is an increasing function of the state variable is larger under ¸ than
0 under ¸ . Thus, stochastic dominance has many implications.
3solution to a maximization problem, this result is complementary to the work in
the monotone comparative statics literature. This literature characterizes when
optimal decisions are monotone in parameters that describe the objective and
constraints.
It is important to emphasize at this point that comparative dynamics and
comparative statics focus on di®erent objects. Speci¯cally, the monotone com-
parative statics literature characterizes when optimal decisions are monotone in
parameters whereas the monotone comparative dynamics characterizes when fu-
ture distributions are increasing in the initial distribution and/or a parameter
a®ecting the dynamics. The case when distributions are ordered by stochastic
dominance brings these two literatures together as comparative statics results are
key to establishing assumptions on primitives so that comparative dynamics are
monotone. However, for some monotone comparative dynamics problems proper-
ties beyond the monotonicity of decision rules and shock processes are essential.
This will be the case when some binary relation other than stochastic dominance
is used to order distributions. The last section of the paper provides an example
illustrating this point.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The literature related
to this paper is brie°y outlined in section 1.1. The framework for monotone
comparative dynamics is described in section 2. The results are stated and proved
in section 3. The results are applied in several examples in section 4.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to work in three areas. First, Hopenhayn and Prescott
(1992) analyze when stationary distributions (i.e. steady states) exist, are unique
and increase in a parameter. Their work and the work in this paper are related
as both focus on distributions as the unit of analysis and both make use of
monotonicity properties of functions mapping a set of distributions into itself.
Both lines of research are complementary in that one characterizes steady states,
whereas the other characterizes comparative dynamics. The monotone compar-
ative dynamics proposition provided here is applicable regardless of whether or
not steady states exist. An important application where steady states are not
relevant is the class of problems focusing on consumer behavior over the life cycle.
Second, this paper is complementary to the work in the monotone comparative
statics literature (see Milgrom and Shannon (1996) or Topkis (1998)). This lit-
erature o®ers techniques to characterize when optimal decisions are increasing in
4parameters describing objectives and constraints. As remarked previously, the
monotone comparative statics literature links up perfectly with the monotone
comparative dynamics results of this paper when stochastic dominance is used to
order distributions. Third, there is a literature on comparative dynamics within
capital theory. The standard problem in this literature (see Becker and Boyd
(1997)) is to compare how the capital stock varies over time in deterministic
models when a parameter (i.e. tax rate or a discount factor) is increased or an
initial condition (i.e. the capital stock) is increased. The comparative dynamics
framework developed here covers problems of this type as a special case.
2 Framework
The framework is based on the following assumptions: (i) a function T maps jµ
the set ¤(X;X) into itself, where ¤(X;X) is the set of probability measures
de¯ned on a measurable space (X;X) and X is called the state space and (ii)
there is a re°exive and transitive binary relation º on ¤(X;X) and a re°exive
binary relation ¸ on the parameter space £. It is sometimes useful to state £
the mapping T in terms of other objects. For example, equation (1) states jµ
this mapping in terms of a transition function P . Transition functions are a jµ
standard tool in the theory of Markov processes. The transition function on the
state variable is de¯ned in equation (2) in terms of a decision rule y(x;j;µ) and
a transition function ¼ for a Markov shock process. In this context, the state jµ
variable is x = (y;z) and the state space is specialized to be X = Y £ Z, where
Y is the set of possible values of the decision variable and Z is the set of possible
values of a shock. This specialized formulation of the state space is widely used
in the dynamic models presented in Stokey and Lucas (1989).
Z
¸ (B) = T ¸ (B) ´ P (x;B)d¸ ;8B 2 X (1) j+1 jµ j jµ j
X
Z
0 0 ¸ (B) = T ¸ (B) ´ ¼ (z;fz : (y(x;j;µ);z ) 2 Bg)d¸ ;8B 2 X (2) j+1 jµ j jµ j
X
De¯nition 1 de¯nes terms. Stochastic dominance and transition functions
are given the following interpretations. Stochastic dominance describes when
one distribution is larger than another in the sense that more probability or
52 weight is put on high realizations. A transition function P(x;B) states the
probability that next period's state will lie in B given that this period's state is
x. The de¯nition of comparative dynamics is that described in the introduction.
A di®erent but related notion of economic dynamics occurs when the sequence
de¯ned by ¸ = T ¸ is monotone in time. For this notion, a useful proposition j+1 jµ j
would be ¸ º ¸ =) ¸ º ¸ . When T is time invariant, necessary and j+1 j j+2 j+1 jµ
su±cient conditions for this proposition follow from the results of this paper.
DEFINITION 1: Let (X;¸ ) be a partially ordered set, (X;X) be a measur- X
able space and ¤(X;X) be the set of probability measures on (X;X).
(i) A set B µ X is increasing provided y 2 B whenever y ¸ x;y 2 X and X
x 2 B.
0 0 0 (ii) For each ¸;¸ 2 ¤(X;X), ¸ stochastically dominates ¸ (denoted ¸ º ¸ ) sd
0 provided ¸(B) ¸ ¸ (B) for all increasing sets B 2 X.
(iii) P : X£X ! [0;1] is a transition function provided (i) 8x 2 X, P(x;:) is a
probability measure on (X;X) and (ii) P(:;B) is a X measurable function
8B 2 X.
0 (iv) Comparative dynamics are monotone provided for all µ;µ 2 £, for all
0 0 ¸ ;¸ 2 ¤(X;X) and for all j the following proposition holds: µ ¸ µ j £ j
0 0 and ¸ º ¸ =) ¸ º ¸ , k = 0;1;:::: j j+k j j+k
3 Results
All the results in the paper build upon Theorem 1. Theorem 1 states that Tjµ
satisfying assumptions A1-2 is necessary and su±cient for the monotone compar-
ative dynamics proposition stated in the introduction and de¯ned in De¯nition
1.
0 0
0 A1 (T increases in µ) 8µ;µ 2 £, µ ¸ µ =) T ¸ º T ¸, 8¸ 2 ¤(X;X). jµ £ jµ jµ
0 0 0 A2 (T preserves order) 8¸;¸ 2 ¤(X;X), ¸ º ¸ =) T ¸ º T ¸ ;8µ 2 £ jµ jµ jµ
2An equivalent de¯nition of stochastic dominance (see Lehmann 1955 or Shaked and Shanthikumar 1994) R R
0 0 is as follows: ¸ stochastically dominates ¸ provided f(x)d¸ ¸ f(x)d¸ for all measurable, increasing
functions f for which the integrals exist. Note that the de¯nition of stochastic dominance is based on a
partially ordered set (X;¸ ). A partial order ¸ is re°exive, transitive and antisymmetric. X X
6THEOREM 1: Assume º is a re°exive and transitive binary relation on
¤(X;X), ¸ is a re°exive binary relation on £ and T : ¤(X;X) ! ¤(X;X) £ jµ
for all (j;µ) 2 f1;2;:::g £ £.
Comparative dynamics are monotone if and only if T satis¯es A1-2. jµ
Proof:
(=)) A1 follows from the de¯nition of monotone comparative dynamics by
0 0 letting ¸ = ¸ , whereas A2 follows by letting µ = µ . j j
0 0 0
0 ((=) It is su±cient to show that µ ¸ µ and ¸ º ¸ =) T ¸ º T ¸ . £ j jµ j jµ j j
This is established in the equation below. The leftmost inequality below holds
0
0 by A2. The rightmost inequality below holds by A1. T ¸ º T ¸ then holds jµ j jµ j
by transitivity.
0 0 0
0 ¸ = T ¸ º T ¸ º T ¸ = ¸ j+1 jµ j jµ jµ j j j+1
Theorem 2 restates Theorem 1 in terms of properties of transition functions.
The result is that a transition function that is increasing in the state x and in
the parameter µ is a necessary and su±cient condition for comparative dynamics
to be monotone when distributions are ordered by stochastic dominance. The
proof is based on showing that P increasing in µ is equivalent to T increasing jµ jµ
in µ and that P increasing in x is equivalent to T preserving order. Thus, jµ jµ
key properties of the map T are easily restated in terms of properties of the jµ
transition function P . jµ
0 0
0 B1 (P increases in µ) 8µ;µ 2 £, µ ¸ µ =) P (x;:) º P (x;:), 8x 2 X. jµ £ jµ sd jµ
0 0 0 B2 (P increases in x) 8x;x 2 X, x ¸ x =) P (x;:) º P (x ;:);8µ 2 £ jµ X jµ sd jµ
THEOREM 2: Assume (X;¸ ) is a partially ordered set, ¸ is a re°exive X £
binary relation on £, P is a transition function for all (j;µ) 2 f1;2;:::g £ £, jµ
T is de¯ned by equation (1) and stochastic dominance is the binary relation on jµ
distributions.
Comparative dynamics are monotone if and only if P satis¯es B1-2. jµ
Proof: The result follows from Theorem 1 and Lemma 1.
LEMMA 1: Assume (X;¸ ) is a partially ordered set, ¸ is a re°exive X £
binary relation on £, P is a transition function for all (j;µ) 2 f1;2;:::g £ £, jµ
T is de¯ned by equation (1) and stochastic dominance is the binary relation on jµ
distributions.
7(i) P satis¯es B1 if and only if T satis¯es A1. jµ jµ
(ii) P satis¯es B2 if and only if T satis¯es A2. jµ jµ
Proof:
(i) Show B1 if and only if A1. The de¯nition of T in equation (1) and jµ R R
0 0 assumption B1 imply that T ¸(B) = P (x;B)d¸ ¸ P (x;B)d¸ = T ¸(B) jµ jµ jµ jµ
for all increasing sets B 2 X because for all values of x and B the integrand
0 P (x;B) ¸ P (x;B). To show the reverse implication, let ¸ be the measure jµ jµ
putting all mass on a single point x.
R 0 (ii) Show B2 if and only if A2. A2 is restated as ¸ º ¸ ) P (x;B)d¸ ¸ sd jµ R 0 P (x;B)d¸ for all increasing sets B 2 X. Two facts establish that B2 implies jµ R R 0 0 A2. First, ¸ º ¸ implies f(x)d¸ ¸ f(x)d¸ for allmeasurable and increasing sd
functions f for which the integrals exist. See Lehmann (1955) or Shaked and
Shanthikumar (1994, Ch. 1) for a proof. Second, P (x;B) is an increasing jµ
function of x for all increasing sets B 2 X and the integral of this function
0 clearly exists. To show the reverse implication, let ¸ and ¸ be measures putting
0 0 all mass on a single point x and x respectfully, where x ¸ x . X
Theorem 3 is useful in many applications. In Theorem 3 the mapping Tjµ
and the transition function P are de¯ned directly in terms of a decision rule jµ
and an exogenous Markov shock process (see equation (2) in section 2). Many
of the dynamic models considered in Stokey and Lucas (1989) can be posed in
terms of decision rules and exogenous shock processes. Theorem 3 states that if
the decision rule y(x;j;µ) and transition probabilities ¼ are increasing in the jµ
parameter µ (assumption C1) and if the decision rule and transition probabili-
ties are increasing in x and z (assumption C2) then comparative dynamics are
monotone. The proof is based on observing that the two properties in C1 are
reinforcing in producing a transition function P that increases in the parameter jµ
µ (assumption B1) and that the two properties in C2 are reinforcing in making
3 P increase in the state x (assumption B2). jµ
In Theorem 3 it is important to note that (i) the state space has a product
representation X = Y £Z, where Y and Z can be interpreted as the endogenous
and exogenous components of the state variable, (ii) a decision rule y : X £
3Conditions C1 and C2 are su±cient but not necessary for producing monotone comparative dynamics.
To see this point consider an example. Let Y = Z = £ = f0;1g with the usual orders. Let y(x;j;µ) and ¼jµ
be arbitrary as long as y(x;j;µ) 2 Y;8x;j;µ. P is then trivially monotone in x and µ when the measurable jµ
sets X;Y;Z consist of only the empty set and the entire set.
80 f1;2;::::g £ £ ! Y is considered which is increasing in that x ¸ x implies X
0 y(x;j;µ) ¸ y(x ;j;µ), (iii) ¼ : Z £ Z ! [0;1] is a transition function de¯ned Y jµ
on the exogenous shocks, (iv) ¼ increasing in z or µ always means in the sense jµ
0 of stochastic dominance and (v) (X;¸ ) has the component order (i.e. x ¸ x X X
0 0 0 0 0 provided (y ¸ y and z ¸ z ), where x = (y;z);x = (y ;z )). Y Z
C1: y(x;j;µ) increases in µ;8(x;j) and ¼ increases in µ;8(j;z). jµ
C2: y(x;j;µ) increases in x and ¼ increases in z;8(j;µ). jµ
C3: y(x;j;µ) is measurable in x;8(j;µ).
C4: (X;¸ ), (Y;¸ ), (Z;¸ ) are partially ordered sets, (X;X), (Y;Y), X Y Z
(Z;Z) are measurable spaces, ¸ is a re°exive binary relation on £, X = £
Y £ Z, ¸ is the component order and X is the product ¾-algebra. X
THEOREM 3: Assume that T is de¯ned by equation (2), stochastic domi- jµ
nance is the binary relation on distributions and the regularity conditions C3-4
hold.
Then y(x;j;µ) and ¼ satisfy C1-2 imply that comparative dynamics are jµ
monotone.
Proof: First, note that since y(x;j;µ) is measurable (assumption C3) then
Stokey and Lucas (1989, Theorem 9.13) implies that T de¯ned in equation (2) jµ
maps ¤(X;X) into itself. Second, let the transition function P be constructed jµ
as indicated in equation (2). Then C1 gives su±cient conditions for P to satisfy jµ
B1 and C2 gives su±cient conditions for P to satisfy B2. Thus, Theorem 3 jµ
follows from Theorem 2.
4 Examples
The results from the previous section are now illustrated by several examples.
Examples 1 and 2 are single agent problems with uncertainty which are drawn
from the literatures on optimal growth and commodity storage. Theorem 3 of
4 this paper is applied to both examples. Example 3 highlights the point that
4The reader will observe that shocks are independent in both example 1 and 2. Clearly, this is not
important for applying Theorem 3. However, it is useful since existing results from these literatures, which
have been established for the case of independent shocks, can immediately be used to make comparative
dynamic statements.
9often interesting monotone comparative dynamics problems require that some
binary relation other than stochastic dominance orders distributions and the
point that when this is the case properties of decision rules beyond monotonicity
are needed. In this example the conclusions are established by a direct application
of the general result proved in Theorem 1. Example 4 shows how to map a
heterogeneous-agent model into the comparative dynamics framework.
Example 1: Optimal Growth - Brock and Mirman (1972)
P1 j The optimal growth problem is to maximize E[ ¯ u(z f(k )¡k )] sub- j j j+1 j=0
ject to the constraint 0 · k · z f(k ). In this problem z f(k ) is the produc- j+1 j j j j
tion function in period j, which depends on capital k and an independent and j
identically distributed shock z with distribution ¼. The state x = (y;z) consists j
of the capital stock y = k and the shock z. Brock and Mirman (1972, Lemma
1.1-1.2) establish that the optimal decision rule y(x;j;µ) for capital brought into
the next period is a continuous and time-invariant function of the state and in-
creases in each component of the state. Danthine and Donaldson (1981, Theorem
5.1) establish that y(x;j;µ) is an increasing function of the discount factor µ = ¯.
Given these properties of the decision rule and shocks, Theorem 3 implies that
the expected path of capital or output over time is always weakly greater with
higher values of the discount factor ¯ and/or higher values of the initial capital
stock. These results complement the comparative steady state analysis provided
for this model by Danthine and Donaldson (1981).
Example 2: Commodity Storage - Deaton and Laroque (1992)
Deaton and Laroque (1992) study the problem of competitive storage of a
commodity where harvests are independent and identically distributed and the
market demand curve is downward sloping in the quantity consumed. The state
x = (y;z) consists of beginning-of-period inventory y and harvest z. They prove
that there is a unique rational expectations equilibrium with pro¯t maximizing
storage. Furthermore, they prove that the inventory decision y(x;j;µ) is (i) a
continuous, increasing and time-invariant function of the state x and (ii) an in-
creasing function of the discount factor µ at which future payo®s are discounted.
Based on these results, Theorem 3 implies that expected future inventories are in-
creasing in the discount factor starting from any distribution of the state and that
expected future inventories are increasing in the initial inventory and harvest.
Example 3: Precautionary Wealth Accumulation - Huggett (2001)
One of the fundamental questions in the theory of precautionary savings is
when do increases in earnings risk lead to increases in an agent's expected wealth
10accumulation at each age over the life cycle? The underlying decision problem
that agent's face is the standard problem in the literature that formalizes the
permanent-income hypothesis (e.g. Schechtman (1976)). For this problem the
stateis x = (y;z), where y is wealth and z is an earnings shock, and the parameter
5 µ indexes earnings processes ¼ that are independent over periods. The amount jµ
of wealth that is carried from one period to the next is described by a decision
rule y(x;j;µ).
Huggett (2001) answers this question both at the level of properties of deci-
sion rules and properties of preferences by using the general approach to mono-
tone comparative dynamics advanced in this paper. He uses the increasing-
6 convex stochastic order rather than stochastic dominance. The increasing-
convex stochastic order is better suited for determining when expected wealth
accumulation increases with increases in earnings risk. Heuristically, this is be-
cause the distribution of wealth may be more dispersed as earnings risk increases
at the same time that mean wealth holding increases. The increasing-convex
stochastic order allows two such distributions to be ordered whereas stochastic
dominance does not.
Huggett (2001) uses the general result in Theorem 1 of this paper to show
that when the decision rule for wealth accumulation y(x;j;µ) is increasing and
convex in the state x and increasing in earnings risk µ then comparative dynamics
are monotone. An implication is that expected wealth accumulation at each age
over the life cycle increases with increases in risk and/or with increases in initial
wealth holding.
A sketch of the argument behind this result is to note ¯rst that T increases jµ
in µ (assumption A1) is equivalent to the three expressions below, where the
functions f are those that are increasing and convex. The expression E [fjx] ´ jµ R 0 0 f(x )P (x;dx ) is simply a conditional expectation. Huggett notes that the jµ
rightmost inequalities hold when E [fjx] increases in µ and this in turn holds jµ
when y(x;j;µ) increases in µ and ¼ increases in µ in the sense of increasing risk jµ
described earlier.
5The partial order ¸ on earnings processes is a natural generalization of the de¯nition of increasing £
risk provided in Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). In particular, one earnings process is riskier than another
provided that period by period one distribution is riskier than another in the Rothschild-Stiglitz sense. R R
6 0 0 ¸ dominates ¸ in the increasing-convex order provided fd¸ ¸ fd¸ for all measurable f that are
increasing and convex and for which the integrals exist. Since f(x) = y is an increasing and convex function
0 representing wealth holding, ¸ dominates ¸ in the increasing-convex order implies that expected wealth
0 holding is higher under ¸ than under ¸ .
11Z Z Z Z
0 0 0 T ¸ º T ¸ , fdT ¸ ¸ fdT ¸ , E [fjx]d¸ ¸ E [fjx]d¸ jµ jµ jµ jµ jµ jµ
The remainder of the argument is to note that T preserves order (assumption jµ
A2) is again equivalent to the three expressions below. Huggett then notes that
the rightmost inequalities hold when E [fjx] is increasing and convex in x and jµ
that this holds when y(x;j;µ) is increasing and convex in x.
Z Z Z Z
0 0 0 T ¸ º T ¸ , fdT ¸ ¸ fdT ¸ , E [fjx]d¸ ¸ E [fjx]d¸ jµ jµ jµ jµ jµ jµ
Example 4: Growth with Idiosyncratic Shocks - Huggett (1997)
Huggett (1997)generalizes the standard, one-sector, competitive growthmodel
to include incomplete markets and idiosyncratic labor endowment risk. There is
a continuum of agents of mass equal to one who are homogeneous in preferences
but possibly heterogeneous in period labor endowment and the holdings of a
risk-free asset. An agent's state variable is x = (y;z), where y is current asset
holding and z is a Markovian labor endowment shock with transition probabil-
ity ¼ . The distribution of agents over states is denoted ¸, whereas µ denotes µ
a parameter entering agent's preferences and/or Markovian endowment process.
An equilibrium in this model is (c(x;¸;µ);y(x;¸;µ);W(¸);R(¸);T (¸)) such that µ
(i) c;y are optimal decision rules, given W;R and T, (ii) W;R are competitive
wages and gross interest rates, (iii) c;y are feasible in that consumption and next
period's asset holding summed over the population equal available total output R
F(¸) (i.e. (c(x;¸;µ)+k(x;¸;µ))d¸ = F(¸), 8¸) and (iv) T is a law of motion, µ X
de¯ned below, mapping this period's distribution into next period's distribution.
Z
0 ¸ (B) = T ¸(B) ´ P (x;B)d¸;8B 2 X µ ¸µ
X
0 0 P (x;B) ´ ¼ (z;fz : (y(x;¸;µ);z ) 2 Bg) ¸µ µ
Clearly, Theorem 1 provides necessary and su±cient conditions for monotone
comparative dynamics in this model. However, since the distribution ¸ enters
the transition function P above but not in the framework described previously, ¸µ
Theorems 2 and 3 are not applicable. With this said, it turns out that it is
straightforward to verify that (i) P increases in µ is su±cient for T to increase ¸µ µ
12in µ (assumption A1) and that (ii) P increases in (x;¸) (using the coordinate ¸µ
order) is su±cient for T to preserve order (assumption A2). Thus, a version µ
of Theorem 2 can be established that o®ers su±cient conditions for monotone
comparative dynamics for this example. Using this result it is then easy to
state su±cient conditions in terms of properties of decision rules and exogenous
Markov processes along the lines of Theorem 3. In particular, y(x;¸;µ) increasing
in (x;¸) and ¼ increasing in z in the sense of stochastic dominance is su±cient µ
for assumption A2 to hold, while y(x;¸;µ) increasing in µ and ¼ increasing in µ µ
is su±cient for assumption A1 to hold.
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